Chanakya, the master of statecraft, provided an ancient framework for foreign policy in his Arthashastra. He suggested that states pursue foreign policies that protect their interests and security on some issues while recognising that other states will do the same. He perceptively wrote, “There is some self-interest behind every friendship. There is no friendship without self-interest. This is the bitter truth.” Known as the Mandala construct, Chanakya postulated that one’s foreign relations would span four types of states: ari—or enemies, mitra—or allies, madhyama—or mediators, and udasina—or neutrals.

He then outlined six possible foreign policy strategies—the shadguna. First, sandhi—a treaty for both parties to maintain stability. The second, asana—strategic neutrality or status quo. Third, yana—war preparation to signal readiness to attack or defend. Fourth, vigraha—or active conflict. Fifth, sansraya—seeking an alliance with others to counter a threat. But finally, there is dvaidhibhava—or employing multiple strategies in parallel with one or more states. Nothing exemplifies dvaidabhava better than the Indo-US relationship. The proof of that is Bangladesh.

For those who believe that the Indo-US relationship is that of mitras—or allies—there is enough to back that claim. Both countries are democracies and understand the necessity of countering China. The US is one of India’s top three arms suppliers, with a rapidly increasing share. The Indian diaspora pays 6% of America’s taxes while only constituting 1% of its population. CEOs of Indian descent head some of the most prominent American corporations. Substantial investments by American companies are flowing into India. With massive purchases, India supports many business sectors in the US—such as the aircraft industry. Both countries have worked towards strengthening the Quad and G20. Technological cooperation is rapidly increasing. America is India’s biggest trading partner and is one of the countries with whom India has a substantial trade surplus. The joint Indo-US statement in 2022 affirms “a vision of the US and India as among the closest partners in the world.”

But for those who believe that the relationship is that of aris—or enemies—there is enough proof. For example, it is common practice for the USCIRF to make statements about the perceived state of religious minorities in India. The US State Department routinely expresses “concern” about India’s internal matters, such as the CAA. US-based think tanks such as Freedom House call India an “illiberal democracy”, while American universities and media hate India almost as much as they hate Israel. The US applies pressure on India over an alleged plot to assassinate a Khalistani militant while confabulating in the Five Eyes with its Anglosphere buddies like Canada. Its continuing engagement with Pakistan irks India. On its part, India rankles America by buying Russian oil and arms and refusing to ditch Putin. It maintains a relationship with Iran that the US detests. It refuses to be classified as an American ally or dragged into a future Taiwan conflict. Historically, it has walked a tough, independent line on nuclear weapons. It even works within BRICS to find alternatives to the American dollar.

So, which view should we believe? Is the Indo-US relationship one of allies or enemies? The American novelist T. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that the test of intelligence is “the ability to hold two opposed ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” In Quantum Theory, Schrödinger's Cat can simultaneously be alive and dead. And in foreign policy, the Indo-US equation can simultaneously be one of mitra and ari.

Nothing symbolises the quantum nature of the relationship better than the present crisis in Bangladesh. The Bangladesh situation is the US is telling India that if it wishes to be a friend to the US yet remain unallied with it, then the US is free to use the regime change playbook in India’s neighbourhood to advance its interests in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, if Hindus are massacred in Bangladesh, tough. If refugees destabilise India’s eastern borders, so be it. If it results in India’s defense spending shooting up, wonderful. If Islamist forces are unleashed, cool. But hey, we can still be friends!

But geopolitics can be visualised as the interaction of multiple forces, much like the tugs and pulls of various vectors in physics. Each player exerts a force or vector that represents its interests, and these can vary in magnitude and direction. The combined effect of all these individual vectors results in a net vector that can often be unexpected. It would have been easy for India to write off Afghanistan in the wake of a Taliban takeover; to think that China’s position in Sri Lanka or the Maldives could not be countered at all; or to assume that the Arab world would always be Pakistan’s friend.

The truth is that the US values India’s democracy, economic rise, and geographical position. But it would like India’s unwavering commitment to the US while keeping its options open. In recent years, India has also been playing the same game—testing the boundaries to see what it can get the US to overlook. It’s easy to get swayed into euphoria or despair by the news events of a given day, but the truth is that both countries want marriage while scouring for affairs on the side.

China’s military strategist, Sun-Tzu wrote that all warfare is based on deception. Sun Tzu says, “When able, we should seem unable. When we are in action, we must seem inactive. When near, we should seem far. When far, the enemy should think we are near.” We forget that deception is needed not only in rivalries but also in alliances. Both countries are indulging in it, bringing a sense of unpredictability to their moves. What needs to be understood is the predictability of such unpredictability.

--- The writer is an author of several works of fiction.